









This article contributes to the developing recognition that the challenges raised 
by the enterprise of translating between languages extend beyond human 
language. It suggests that there are parallels between the political issues 
recognised by translation scholars – of exclusion, misrepresentation and 
speaking for ‘the other’ – and those raised by biosemiotics, the study of signs 
in all living systems. Following a discussion of convergence in current 
developments in translation studies, semiotics and human-animal studies, the 
article presents an analysis of empirical data, with specific reference to the 
different meanings of the verb HEAR. The findings demonstrate the 
anthropocentric assumptions that are embedded in the way hearing is routinely 
represented, and an argument is presented for the recognition of these in 
communications about the semiotic resources relevant to non-human life 
forms. The paper concludes with some reflections on the implications of these 
issues for the enterprise of translation.  
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“There’s a lot going on in a bird’s song that human ears can’t 
appreciate.” (Mooney 2014, cited in Ackerman 2016, 139) 
 
“There’s really no such thing as the ‘voiceless.’ There are only the 




We human beings experience the world through our senses, as other living organisms 
do. We are aware that we are experiencing these sensations and emotions and we 
reflect on and communicate about them with others. To do this, we draw on the most 
extensive and sophisticated range of semiotic resources that any species has been able 
to develop, including visual symbols, utterances, written language, technologically 
supported signals across distances (both spatial and temporal), and so on. We engage 
in meta-semiotic discourse, communicating about our communication – and this 
journal is an exemplar of this process: a forum for debate about the challenges raised 
by the variety of forms into which human language has developed, and how those 
challenges may be met and overcome. This article aims to contribute to the growing 
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recognition that these challenges extend beyond human language. While the 
developing field of biosemiotics researches the communicative capacities of all living 
organisms, the focus here is on human communications about the semiotic resources 
relevant to non-human life forms. The paper presents an analysis of empirical data 
collected for a research project investigating how people talk and write about 
animals.1 It focuses on how one dimension of the semiotic resources, experiences and 
behaviour of other-than-human individuals and species are represented in 
contemporary English, by examining the different meanings of the verb HEAR. The 
paper concludes with some reflections on the implications of these issues for the 
enterprise of translation. 
 
 
2. Challenges of translation 
 
The contrasts between a lay-person’s conception of translation – that it entails a fairly 
straightforward transfer of meaning between languages – and that of those who 
practise and study it are well documented. Of particular relevance to this paper are 
such issues as the ever-present potential for “incommensurabilities, disjunctures, and 
power differentials” (Gal 2015, 226), including the ‘colonizing’ potential of 
translations (e.g., Venuti 2000; Tymoczko 2000, 2014), and how to produce 
translations that can truly respect “the autonomy of the Other” (Appiah [1993] 2000, 
428; cf. Tharakeshwar 2009), if, as Temple and Young (2004, 167) acknowledge, 
“speaking for others, in any language, is always a political issue.” To date, discussion 
of these issues has, unsurprisingly, remained almost exclusively ‘intra-species’; that 
is, concepts such as oppression, colonisation, marginalisation, exclusion and 
misrepresentation have been addressed in relation to the unequal distribution and 
statuses of different versions of human language, those who speak them, and the 
discourses and texts that they generate. Meanwhile, as Cronin (2017, 67) notes, 
“animals other than the human have been remarkably silent in its [translation studies’] 
brief history.” However, across the humanities and social sciences, as well as in many 
collectives beyond the academy, increasing attention is being paid both to systematic 
inequalities between humans and other animals, and to the range of communicative 




1 Terminology is problematic. Humans are also animals, and several ways of encoding references to 
non-humans have been proposed, especially by those who find unacceptable the binary distinction, and 
the implications of ‘human’ as the default from which ‘non-human’ deviates. However, the fact that 
(English) language has no accepted form of words to deal with this challenge illustrates one of the 
issues raised in this paper. 
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3. The ‘animal turn’ 
 
Space does not permit a detailed survey of the many strands that comprise these 
developments, so I draw attention here to the issues most relevant to the concerns of 
this journal. One such strand is the expansion of critiques of social inequalities to 
include injustices done to the other-than-human inhabitants of the planet, which is 
motivated in part by the potential for fuller understanding of intra-human conflict, 
since “the discourse of animality has historically served as a crucial strategy in the 
oppression of humans by other humans” (Wolfe 2003, xx, original emphasis). ‘The 
discourse of animality’ includes the many ways in which hierarchies are encoded. 
One of these is the phenomenon of the ‘absent referent’ – the term for the means by 
which members of subordinated groups, of whatever species, are rendered invisible, 
or erased (Adams 1990; Stibbe 2012). Another is the classification of humans with 
specified characteristics (skin colour, sex, disabilities etc.) as equivalent to, or inferior 
to, members of other species (e.g., Bourke 2011; Lundblad 2012; Wolfe 2009). As 
Taylor (2017, online, no page) expresses it, “intellectual inferiority has been so easily 
animalized because animals themselves have long been understood as intellectually 
inferior.” And yet another dimension of the ‘discourse of animality’ is the way many 
metaphors and similes liken stigmatised humans and/or their behaviours, pejoratively, 
to those of non-human animals (Goatly 2006). In these various ways, then, the 
inclusion of other species into critical analyses of social relations, “offers new tools 
for rethinking transnational circuits of power and identity” (Ahuja 2009, 556). 
A second sense in which a non-human perspective aligns with issues of 
translation relates to advocacy and representation on behalf of the ‘other’. There are 
various categories of people whose perspectives are accessed only indirectly by those 
researching them, including people with cognitive impairments and the very young. 
The issue of advocacy on behalf of a social group by its own members is illustrated 
by Temple and Young (2004), in their discussion of how Deaf interpreters are 
perceived in social research studies, given the structural constraints on modifying 
conventional practices so that members of the Deaf community being researched can 
participate fully in setting questions and can “hold their own” in the “active 
construction of meaning” arising from the research (173). This issue may be thought 
of as a continuum. At one end are full participants in the first-hand representation of 
their own interests, with access to influential communications in linguistic media in 
which they feel confident. At another point on this continuum are people who have 
the potential to represent themselves – and others whose interests they share – 
provided those interests can be translated without loss of authenticity. Then there are 
the least powerful groups, who are dependent on others to translate on their behalf – 
and it is here that advocacy for animals’ interests is to be considered.  
As one author maintains, “[animals] enter policy dialogues only through those 
who would speak for them,” and “speaking for animals means interpreting them, 
translating their animal minds into human language” (Carbone 2004, 6, 4). However, 
unsurprisingly, there is no consensus about how this is to be done. At the centre of 
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this debate is an issue familiar from mainstream translation studies: whether to 
emphasise the similarities between ‘us’ (humans) and ‘the other’ (non-humans), or to 
recognise – even celebrate – the differences, and find means of accommodating them 
within the constraints of human language. 
The most well-worn research area in comparative human-animal 
communication focuses on the extent and limits of non-human species to participate 
in the use of some kind of linguistic semiosis. It is well established, for example, that 
some primates can learn versions of human-devised symbols (Savage-Rumbaugh 
1986; Segerdahl, Fields, and Savage-Rumbaugh 2005), that Grey parrots can 
demonstrate some aspects of referential vocalizations (Pepperberg 2007, 2010), and 
that dogs can respond to semantic information (Taylor et al. 2014). However, as 
various commentators have pointed out, these lines of enquiry tend towards the 
anthropocentric, in the sense that their ‘pivot’ is the human norm, against which the 
capacities and practices of other species are measured. “If semiosis is admitted to take 
place in the animal world at all,” maintains Hoffmeyer (2010, 387n), “it is seen as a 
degenerate version of human semiosis,” with the differences between the two 
“typically emphasized over and over” (de Waal 2012, 191). The fact that properties of 
human languages such as abstraction and recursion set them apart from the 
communicative resources of other species can be used to make a circular argument. 
Approaching the latter from the perspective of the former – that is, “using constructs 
developed for one recently evolved and possibly highly derived system of 
communication (language)” (Rendall, Owren, and Ryan 2009, 238) to seek to 
understand the communicative practices of very different kinds of creatures – risks 
closing off our ability to perceive their diverse, unfamiliar properties. Again, there are 
parallels here with people who are “considered diverse with regard to language, 
culture, ethnicity, and class [who] are particularly vulnerable to representations 
grounded in a deficit discourse” (Whitehouse and Colvin 2001, 212). As long as 
animal communication is compared and contrasted with human language, humans – 
and particularly the most advantaged humans – will continue to come out ‘on top’. 
Alternative perspectives include the suggestion that language constrains human 
perception (e.g., Derrida 2003) and an interest, on the part of some disability scholars, 
in both human and non-human “forms of subjectivity that are not language-based” 
(Weil 2006, 87; see also Grandin and Johnson 2009). 
 
 
4. Semiosis and signs 
 
Challenges are emerging to the dualisms that separate human language from all other 
forms of semiosis, and the semiotic from the non-semiotic world. A more inclusive 
concept is found in the theory developed by Peirce (c. 1897), where a sign “is 
something which stands to somebody for something in some respect or capacity” (CP 
2.228). Processes of interpretation and translation are integral to Peirce’s theory of the 
sign, in the ‘intralingual’ sense of translation (Jakobson [1959] 2000), while some 
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attention has also been drawn to the relevance of his work for translation studies more 
generally (e.g., Gorlée 1994, 2004; Queiroz and Aguiar 2015; Stecconi 2007). 
However, it is important to note that the ‘somebody’ in the above quotation 
from Peirce need not necessarily be human. Recognition of the need to comprehend 
the crucial role of signs in communication beyond the human gave rise to 
‘zoösemiotics’, the term that denotes “the scientific study of signalling behavior in 
and across animal species” (Sebeok 1968, 142), and later ‘ecosemiotics’, defined by 
Kull (1998, 350) as “the semiotics of relationships between nature and culture,” but 
slightly differently by Nöth (1998, 333) as “the study of the semiotic interrelations 
between organisms and their environment.” The latter definition encompasses non-
intentional signs that are nevertheless interpretable by living organisms; for example, 
one animal may involuntarily give off a scent which alerts another animal to its 
presence as potential prey (Brier 2008). Human beings too communicate not only via 
lexis and grammar, facial expressions and gesture, but also by emitting involuntary 
signals generated by biologically regulated systems such as hormones and reflexes. 
Notwithstanding debates about terminology (e.g., Kull 1998; Maran 2007; Maran and 
Kull 2014), the most relevant term in the present context for this rapidly developing 
field of study is ‘biosemiotics’, defined as “the study of the myriad forms of 
communication and signification observable both within and between living systems” 
(Favareau 2010, v), or “the study of signs and signification of cognition and 
communication – also in the form of language – in all living systems” (Brier 2008, 
48). From this perspective, living creatures are not so much passive entities, whose 
behaviour is determined by their genes and the immutable ‘laws of nature’, as “active 
systems of sign production, sign mediation and sign interpretation, that harness the 
physical laws in order to live and sometimes make a more complex living” (Kull, 
Emmeche, and Hoffmeyer 2011, 1). 
In contrast to a “crude ontology of genes with deterministic developmental 
capacities, and isolated, self-interested individuals” (Dupré 2012, 99), biosemiotics is 
consistent with an ontology that can accommodate living entities as emergent, 
dynamic and inter-connected, including through symbiotic processes. This puts it at 
odds with the conventional hierarchy of communication, where humans with their 
complex, symbolic language are at the apex, primates on the rung below – but above 
all other ‘macro’ life forms (mammals, birds, fish) – and from which microorganisms 
are typically absent. Against this, contemporary work in biology reveals how even 
‘primitive’ organisms interact semiotically with their environment as they identify 
and select or avoid components within it in order to survive (Nöth 2001, 75; see also 
Hird 2009, 53), a notion that is gradually being taken up in dialogue between 
biosemiotics and translation studies (Marais and Kull 2016). 
Although as humans we may be used to thinking of ourselves as discrete, 
unitary entities, we too actually exist in a symbiotic relationship with myriad 
microorganisms, and could not survive without continual access to other entities, 
including the substances we ingest for sustenance, not to mention all the other entities 
with which we are enmeshed in assemblages of many kinds. Living organisms, then, 
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which are necessarily adaptable rather than fixed, may better be understood as 
‘processes’ rather than ‘things’ – processes that both respond to, and contribute to the 
construction of, their environments or niches (Dupré 2012, 99). A typical example is 
the way some moths emit ultrasonic clicks in response to bat echolocation calls, thus 
indirectly modifying evolutionary developments both in kinds of species (Waters 
2003). Into this context fits the Peircean concept of the sign as itself processual (e.g., 
Merrell 2001), as “neither a thing nor a concept [but rather] a pure relation whereby a 
receptive system orders its world” (Hoffmeyer 2010, 373), a relation whose meaning 
lies in its “practical effects” (Nöth 2012, 296). 
An obvious implication of this more inclusive, ‘open’ view of representation 
is that it is “something both more general and more widely distributed than human 
language” (Kohn 2013, 38), and, although the symbolic modalities of human 
language are emergent from the indexical, and the indexical from the iconic, these 
other modalities have properties of their own. Moreover, the affordances of the 
perceiver and of that which is perceived, as well as the relation between them, affects 
them both. That relationship-network of organisms with their capacities, needs, and 
environment constitutes their experiential world, or umwelt (von Uexküll 1982), and 
involves the interpretation of meaningful signs. Yet, our own primary mode of 
communicating about other-than-human modes of communication is the symbolic 
mode of human language, and it has been claimed that “extending linguistic 
relationality to nonhumans narcissistically projects the human onto that which lies 
beyond it” (Kohn 2013, 84). This brings me to my empirical example. 
 
 
5. A meta-semiotic lexeme: HEAR 
 
5.1 Linguistic commentary on HEAR 
 
Consistently with the ideas presented above, I illustrate the challenge of ‘translating’ 
across umwelten by starting not with nouns denoting species, and contrasts among 
them, but instead with a verb that represents a relational, communicative process – 
HEAR. HEAR is a very frequent verb in English; it occurs 367 times per million words 
in the British National Corpus (BNC) (Leech, Rayson, and Wilson 2001), although 
this is less frequent than SEE at 1920 occurrences per million words. This reflects the 
‘perception verb hierarchy’ (Viberg 1983), which privileges the sense of sight above 
hearing because – for human beings – sight is the primary mode of direct perception, 
so that “it makes sense that certain sensory modalities enjoy greater prominence and 
frequency in linguistic representation” (Whitt 2009, 1084). Nevertheless, hearing is a 
core perceptual sense, and one shared among many kinds of animals (though see 
below). Its primary definition in the OED is intransitive: “to perceive, or have the 
sensation of, sound; to possess or exercise the faculty of audition.” In its transitive 
sense, the objects of HEAR, according to the OED, are “sound, or something that emits 
or causes sound.” However, corpus evidence demonstrates that what humans are 
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reported to hear is very frequently linguistic communication. For example, studies 
comparing English HEAR with French ENTENDRE (Lacassain-Lagoin 2015), German 
HÖREN and Spanish OÍR demonstrate that, when the range of syntactic constructions 
around any of these verbs is examined, the most prominent objects ‘heard’ are 
linguistic. Lacassain-Lagoin (2011, 59) reports how HEAR functions to embed “the 
Other’s discourse in one’s own auditory perception” (emphasis added), whether 
reporting in a neutral way or implicitly adding the hearer’s interpretation of what was 
said. Similarly, Whitt (2009, 1095) demonstrates how HEAR and HÖREN both serve to 
express linguistically the ways in which “auditory perception can shape our 
epistemology,” while López and Valenzuela (2004, 15) discuss how ‘hearing’ is used 
in the metaphorical sense of ‘knowing’. A small study using the British National 
Corpus confirms the prominence given to language and culture in what it is that 
human beings are reported to ‘hear’.  
Following the Corpus Pattern Analysis developed by Hanks (2004), a graduate 
student2 classified the patterns found with HEAR in the BNC. She established that the 
single most frequent pattern is transitive, with a human or animal as subject and a 
sound or activity the most frequent object. An example sentence from the BNC 
illustrates how inferences are drawn from sounds about what they may signify:  
 
From what we understand she heard a pop and that is when she noticed the 
pain in her back. 
 
Such inferences are not confined to human modes of perception. For example, in his 
thesis arguing for ‘an anthropology beyond the human’, Kohn (2013) recounts how 
the sound of a tree trunk being chopped by a hunter “stands for something” to a 
monkey in a nearby tree (31), who has learned “to interpret a crashing palm as a sign 
of danger” (52).  
What humans are reported to ‘hear’, however, often includes no actual sounds 
at all, as in the idiom ‘to have one’s voice heard’, which may denote ‘having one’s 
views recognised’ via a written medium. For instance: 
 
such tactics risked reducing the range of titles and thus of voices heard in the 
national press3 
 
The corpus pattern analysis (consistent with the studies cited above) also identified 
non-literal senses in various patterns involving ‘that’ clauses and prepositional 
constructions with ‘about’, ‘from’ and ‘of’. For instance:  
 
I had heard that sight is often impaired by poor health 
 																																																								
2 I am grateful to Emma Franklin for providing this analysis. 
3 All examples in this section are taken from the BNC; underlining highlights references to written 
language. 
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I saw two notices calling public meetings to discuss pollution – the first I and 
many others had heard about this problem 
 
At the time there was a postal strike and I didn’t hear from David for about 3 
or 4 weeks 
Councillor Gene Fitzgerald TD complained that the first council members 
heard of the planning decision was when they read of it in the morning paper 
 
There is also the institutional sense of HEAR where a legal body officially listens to 
and considers information, in order to make a decision. For instance:  
 
The court heard he was hooked on tranquillisers after splitting from his wife 
 
Semantically, the meaning of HEAR extends to include ‘know’ (as discussed above), 
‘understand’ and ‘obey’. For instance:  
 
going down there is a foolish risk – didn’t you hear what he said? 
 
Hear the word of the Lord! 
 
Thus, although the core definition concerns ‘the faculty of audition’, in actual usage 
HEAR covers a wide range of symbolic, linguistic communication among human 
beings.  
 
5.2 The meaning of HEAR beyond the human 
 
That which is registered as sound is emergent from the relation between changes in 
physical matter (particles), a medium (air, water, solids), and a perceiving subject 
who ‘hears’ it. The dictionary definition of ‘hear’ alludes to the ‘specific organ’ of the 
ear, which seems straightforward enough. However, researchers into the evolution of 
hearing have identified the anthropocentrism evident in conventional approaches (Fay 
and Popper 2000): the physiological affordances, environments and behaviours of 
non-human animals accommodate a much more diverse range of vibration and sound 
than is perceptible to human hearing. The organs classified as ‘ears’, which are 
acoustic sensors that have evolved from vibration sensors (Gibson and Windmill 
2017), have characteristics that contrast across different species, including the 
medium through which vibrations travel within different kinds of living organism. For 
example, “many insects produce and detect vibrations that are propagated through the 
substrate that supports them, such as a branch or leaf of a bush or tree” (Hoy 2012, 2). 
Whereas vertebrates tend to have pairs of ears located on the cranium, an insect’s ears 
can be located virtually anywhere on its body (Hoy 2012). In contrast to the 
‘perception verb hierarchy’ of humans (Viberg 1983, cited above), for cetaceans 
sound is more critical than sight (or smell), yet a visual metaphor is used to convey 
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the way many species use echolocation to “‘image’ their environment by analysing 
echoes from a self-generated ultrasonic signal” (Ketten 1992, 718). Whales “hear as 
well as land mammals but in a different medium,” while cetacean ears may be “more 
acoustically and physically diverse than any related land mammal group” (Ketten 
2000, 43, 44), and whales receive most of their sound signals via the jawbones 
(Webster 2017). Furthermore, since sound travels much more slowly through air than 
water, the sonar systems of bats and dolphins, for example, are quite different from 
each other (Au 2004). 
Although human attention is drawn most readily to the sounds within the 
range we can readily hear, this is only a subset of what can be perceived across the 
full range of living organisms, which encompasses wide variations in frequency, 
volume, pitch and timbre (e.g., Manoussaki et al. 2008; Fay 2012; Heffner and 
Heffner 2007; Webster 2017). Many animals also process sounds differently from the 
way humans do. Very small animals, such as those few orders of insects that have 
tympanic membranes, have different ways of identifying the direction of sound 
sources and perceiving frequencies than larger organisms, whose paired ears afford 
more space to enable the detection of the direction of sounds (Gibson and Windmill 
2017), while the asymmetrically placed ears of night-hunting owls enable them to 
calculate vertical and horizontal angles between them and their prey (Webster 2017). 
Linguists are familiar with the way different languages exploit the contrasts 
between vocal sounds in different ways. For example, the sounds represented by [t] 
and [d] in English are distinct from each other. Hence, the words ‘toe’ and ‘doe’ 
denote different things, whereas in Korean there is no meaningful distinction between 
those two sounds. Conversely, English speakers often struggle to hear the variations 
that carry meaning in tonal languages. In comparison to the acoustic contrasts that 
register with humans, there are much greater contrasts between aspects of the sounds 
produced by animals that may be meaningful for them. So, for example, the sound 
produced by dolphins that humans may hear as a ‘squawking’ with tonal qualities “is 
actually a set of rapid echolocation clicks” (Kershenbaum et al. 2014). Birds in 
different habitats vary their songs in different ways, with semiotic significance 
potentially attaching to variations in volume, frequency, sequence of units, repetition 
and so on (ibid.).  
Varied means of producing, as well as perceiving, sound are deployed by 
different animals. These include rubbing parts of the body against other parts or 
against something in the environment (insects), moving two bones together or 
contracting muscles that are connected to the swim bladder (fish) (Popper et al. 2003), 
and detecting seismic vibrations through the foot (elephants) (O’Connell-Rodwell 
2007). Yet, despite this huge range of sound semiosis in living creatures, its 
representations in (English) language seem to gravitate towards a linguistic model. 
Thus, although animals such as crickets, cicadas and grasshoppers do not produce 
sounds by expelling air through a vocal tract, as humans do, their signals are 
nevertheless termed ‘chirps’, ‘calls’ and ‘song-patterns’ (Ragge and Reynolds 1988; 
Gerhardt and Huber 2002). Sounds made by fish may be labelled by terms that 
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suggest the passage of air through a vocal tract, such as ‘whistles’ and ‘grunts’ 
(Zelick, Mann, and Popper 1999). The components of birdsong are known as 
‘syllables’ and ‘phrases’ (Catchpole and Slater 2003), despite the OED definition of a 
syllable as “forming a word or an element of a word […] an element of spoken 
language” and ‘phrase’ as “a small group […] of words” (emphasis added).  
These observations point to two slightly different senses in which discourse 
about animals’ aural communication may be termed ‘linguo/lingua/linguicentric’. 
Variants of this term have been used to refer to the centrality of language in thought 
and culture (e.g., Enfield 2000), the privileging of one human language over others 
(e.g., Dervin 2013), or of language over other human cultural forms such as music 
(e.g., Tomlinson 2015). However, the linguicentrism I intend here is the (tacit) 
acceptance of the primacy of words, summarized provocatively as the idea that 
language is “tantamount to the whole of culture and communication,” and  
 
possessed solely by we overconfident human knowers who think we possess 
genuine knowledge by the mere fact that we are loquacious animals, unlike 
other creatures, who presumably must limp along with those supposedly lesser 
and impoverished modes of communication. (Merrell 2003, 154) 
 
Thus, one kind of linguicentrism in discourse about animals is the way in which 
human language is taken as almost synonymous with all communication, where 
whatever sounds animals make must be (imperfect) approximations of human, 
symbolic language. The second sense in which a language metaphor appropriates 
biosemiosis is the way labels for describing human language are imported into 
accounts of other-than-human communication. To explore this further, in the next 
section of the paper, I present in more detail the findings from an analysis of a topic-
specific corpus on the subject of animals, with specific reference to how HEAR is used 
when animals are either the hearers or the heard. 
 
 
6. Animals hearing and heard 
 
The data used here derives from a three-year project researching the discursive 
representation of animals.4 The corpus, comprising just under 9 million words of 
running text in contemporary British English, includes a wide range of discourse 
types, excluding imaginative discourse such as fiction and poetry, but including 
scientific journal articles, legislation, newspaper articles, transcripts of wildlife 
broadcasts, as well as elicited data from interviews and focus groups. For full details 
see Sealey and Pak (2018). 
																																																								
4 ‘People’, ‘products’, ‘pests’ and ‘pets’ – the discursive representation of animals. Funded by the 
Leverhulme Trust (RPG 2013–063). 
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One set of words for the animal sounds that humans hear occurs in the 
transcripts of wildlife broadcasts, which were obtained by downloading the subtitles 
from the television broadcasts, as these routinely include indications of sounds that 
are important for the film and would be missed by hearing-impaired viewers. 
Examples include: ‘sheep bleat’, ‘cub growling’, ‘goats bleat’, ‘chirping’, ‘croaking’, 
‘buzzing’, etc. Many people believe that such words are onomatopoeic, and indeed 
the definition of onomatopoeia on Wikipedia5 uses “animal noises such as ‘oink’, 
‘miaow’ […], ‘roar’ and ‘chirp’” to exemplify the phenomenon. A spokesperson for 
the company responsible for producing these subtitles explained that, while there are 
no prescriptions on which words should be used to represent animal sounds, most 
staff “would pick the same word” since “a lot of it is simply down to inherited 
cultural wisdom – so cats will ‘meow’, dogs will ‘bark’, mice will ‘squeak’ etc.” 
(Russell, personal communication). However, it has been shown that the way people 
perceive animal sounds is influenced by the language they speak, so that although 
some terms show little variation across languages, others are rendered in the 
contrasting ways illustrated in Table 1. These examples are drawn from the list 
compiled by Derek Abbott and collaborators6 (words originally in a language that 
uses a different alphabet are transliterated into the English alphabet).  
--------------------------- 
TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE 
--------------------------- 
Table 1. Examples of contrasting words for animal sounds in different languages 
Animal sound Dutch English French Greek Hungarian Japanese Russian Spanish Swedish Turkish 
bird (small) tjiep 
cheep/chirp/ 
chirrup/peep 
 tsiou tsiou csip-csirip 
pee pee/ 
pii pii 
fiyt-fiyt  pip-pip jiyk jiyk 






ouah ouah gav gav vau vau wan wan 
hav-hav/ 
gav-gav 
guav vov-vov/voff hauv hauv 
horse neighing  neigh    hi-hiin i-go-go  iihaha  
pig grunting knor knor oink groin groin  
röf-röf (pron.: 
reuf-reuf) 
boo boo hrgu-hrgu oink/oinc nöff-nöff  
 
In addition to the evidence of linguistic influence on human perception of animal 
sounds, the types of animals found in such a list are consistent with the prevalence of 
a relatively narrow range in human discourse – namely, those which feature most 
extensively in human experience (see Sealey and Charles 2013; Sealey and Pak 
2018). 
In order to identify patterns in references to animals in the corpus, we tagged 
every instance of an animal-naming term with a symbol, and for the present 
investigation I retrieved occurrences of the lemma HEAR that are found in proximity to 																																																								
5 https: //en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Onomatopoeia 
6 School of Electrical & Electronic Engineering, University of Adelaide, http: 
//www.eleceng.adelaide.edu.au/personal/dabbott/animal.html 
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these terms. These are grouped semantically, illustrating several aspects of the 
discourse. Table 2 contains examples of the way that qualities of animals’ hearing 
capacities are routinely contrasted with those of humans, while the knowledge 
reported about those abilities, in science publications and in the more informal 
‘edutainment’ of television broadcasts, is available to us only vicariously, via 
technological devices.  
 
--------------------------- 
TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE 
--------------------------- 
Table 2. Animals’ hearing contrasted with that of humans7 
we only HEAR part of the call. [capercaillie] One component is so low-pitched we can’t 
HEAR it at all  
brdcst  
the sea-lions also have superb HEARING  news 
A dog’s HEARING frequency range is between 47 and 44, 000Hz, and they are very 
sensitive to high frequencies  
jrnl 
cetaceans predominantly perceive their world using sound and remarkable HEARING 
abilities; a distinction that makes comparison with primates difficult  
jrnl 
you can’t HEAR it, but he [dog] can  intrvwD 
 
 
A similar set of examples illustrates the kinds of things that animals are reported as 
hearing; see Table 3. 
 
--------------------------- 
TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE 
--------------------------- 
Table 3. Targets of animals’ hearing 
The tawny owl has such good HEARING, it can pick up the slightest rustle 
and home in on its target  
prey brdcst  
Bat-eared foxes can HEAR grubs and termites moving nearly a foot 
below the ground  
prey brdcst  
Even while the eggs are still within the nest, their mother [caiman 
crocodile] can HEAR them [hatchlings] from some way away  
young brdcst 
they [huskies] can HEAR an avalanche coming critical seconds before 
their human companions  
danger news 
the howler monkey whose territorial calls reach 90dB and can be HEARD 






7 The form of the lemma is in small capitals; animal-naming terms are in italics; quantitative and 
contrastive items are in bold; descriptive terms are underlined. 
Key: brdcst = transcript of wildlife broadcast; jrnl = academic journal article; intrvwD = transcript of 
interview with keepers of dogs. 
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The sets of concordance lines in Tables 2 and 3 include both explicit and implicit 
comparisons between sounds made and heard by humans and other species (huskies 
hear an avalanche critical seconds before humans; capercaillie call is so low-pitched 
we can’t hear it) and these abilities often evoke admiration. This illustrates the 
tendency for human beings to act as an implicit benchmark for what it means to 
‘hear’. And the sounds made by animals are also part of humans’ aesthetic 
environment – see Table 4. 
--------------------------- 
TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE 
--------------------------- 
Table 4. Appreciative reports of animal sounds8 
The robin. Blackbird. Song thrush. That’s always nice to HEAR  brdcst 
What you’ll HEAR is a lot of echolocation clicks, but then you’ll HEAR something 
special 
 brdcst 
I like to HEAR the cry of a fox at night, or the hoot of an owl.  Mass Obs 
The song of the humpback, it’s something really beautiful. The most beautiful sound 




The final set of examples reveals the closest links between humans and what other 








TABLE 5 ABOUT HERE 
--------------------------- 
Table 5. Animals’ responses to sounds heard9 
because he [dog] could HEAR the car, his whining would grow in pitch  Mass Obs 
they [rabbits, guinea-pigs] squeak and whistle cutely when they HEAR you chopping 
vegetables for them  
news 
he’s [dog] the other side of the door waiting for us because he’s HEARD us get up  intrvwD 
as soon as they [whales] HEAR the boat noise or HEAR splashing, they’re just going to 
be gone  
brdcst 
I remember going to fetch him [cat] and him miaowing as he HEARD our voices Mass Obs 
Harding et al. (2004) trained rats to press a lever for food reward on HEARING a 
positive 2Hz tone 
jrnl  
he [dog] knows because he HEARS the dish intrvwD  
They [horses] looked at the bowl or placed their muzzle in the bowl after HEARING the 
"click" 
jrnl  




The data examples above are consistent with a perception of the animals featured as 
individual exemplars of their species, who exhibit a limited array of traits and 
capacities. These include hearing, which is discursively linked with navigation, 
locating food, avoiding danger (including humans and other predators), and 
communicating with (potential) mates, with their young and, in the case of pets, with 
their ‘owners’.  
 
 
7. Discussion and implications 
 
These examples bring me back to my opening question, about the tension between, on 
the one hand, making the experience of ‘the other’ accessible by likening it to the 
familiar and, on the other, remaining faithful to its distinctiveness. As Cronin (2017, 
79) puts it, the challenge is to respond to the need for “any post-anthropocentric ethics 
of translation to engage properly with difference.” 
The patterns illustrated in the empirical examples presented above are perhaps 
largely unremarkable. If so, I believe this may be attributable to a kind of ‘triple 
hegemony’. The pervasive belief in human exceptionalism – the idea that human 
beings are both distinct from and superior to all other life forms – has taken different 
forms over the centuries (Thomas 1991), and critics point to its role in current crises 
facing the planet (loss of biodiversity, climate collapse etc.). Yet numerous human 																																																								
9 Note: Underlining indicates animals’ actions.	
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practices predicated on the conviction that we as a species have ‘dominion’ over all 
other living things continue unchallenged. Such practices rely on various norms and 
assumptions being deeply embedded in discourse, as indeed they are, to the extent 
that their identification can amount to statements of the apparently obvious. This, 
indeed, is one way in which hegemony operates, as “a particular social structuring of 
semiotic difference [becomes] hegemonic, become[s] part of the legitimizing 
common sense which sustains relations of domination” (Fairclough 2001, 124). 
Entwined with these assumptions is a second set of presuppositions, and these 
concern the role of semiosis itself in inter- and intra-species interactions. The words 
available to name, describe and interpret signs caused by vibrations are often 
inadequate, so that routine discursive formulations inevitably lead speakers and 
writers towards anthropocentrism, anthropomorphism, or both. My formulation ‘signs 
caused by vibrations’ is periphrastic, but necessarily so since the much more common 
term, ‘sounds’, along with ‘hear’, ‘ears’, etc., fail to include many other ways in 
which animals cause and respond to this range of ‘signs’. Similarly, as Narins, 
Stoeger, and O’Connell-Rodwell (2016, 192) point out, even “the definition of 
infrasound is clearly anthropocentric,” based as it is on the “nominal lower frequency 
limit of human hearing” (emphasis added). In other words, the (English) language 
itself, as a human construct, encodes the experience of ‘hearing’ in human terms. This 
may limit not only our means of representing the myriad sensory experiences of other 
species, but also the potential for understanding and empathy, for example with 
oceanic creatures whose lives are devastated by human-caused marine noise pollution 
(Simmonds et al. 2014). 
And what of my choice of the word ‘signs’? This too is a contested term, with 
researchers holding various positions on the extent of similarities between animal 
communication and human language, and on the appropriateness of linguistic 
terminology, including ‘sign’ as well as ‘reference’, ‘meaning’, ‘interpretation’, etc. 
(e.g., Rendall, Owren, and Ryan 2009; Scott-Phillips 2010; Font and Carazo 2010). 
Particularly in some scientific writing, such a stigma is attached to anthropomorphism 
that descriptions of animal behaviour are often required to be restricted to “the 
physical, the visible, the objective” (Carbone 2004, 209; Sealey and Oakley 2013). 
Therefore, communication among animals may be reported in quasi-mechanistic 
terms, allowing for the involvement of ‘senders’, ‘receivers’ and ‘signals’, and 
perhaps ‘negative emotional arousal’, but not for less directly observable processes 
such as ‘thinking’, much less those that imply complex, interactional experiences such 
as ‘grief’, ‘jealousy’ (Tudge 2013) – or indeed other ways of being-in-the-world of 
which we humans may be unaware. 
The third taken-for-granted set of assumptions that restricts the options for 
reporting animals’ experiences is the way animals’ modes of hearing are represented 
as ‘adaptations’, in the Darwinian sense of having evolved to contribute to their 
survival and reproduction. Again, this seems an unexceptionable position, but it is 
framed within a discourse which, while superficially neutral as to ethics and values, is 
profoundly political. It is the discourse of the ‘selfishness’ of the gene (Dawkins 
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[1976] 2006), of competition between discrete individuals, where “communication is 
the result of a coevolutionary arms race between senders playing the role of 
manipulators and receivers playing the role of mind readers” (Font and Carazo 2010, 
e3, summarising Dawkins 1984). This remains an influential paradigm, despite 
challenges from philosophers (e.g., Midgley 1979), ethologists (e.g., Bekoff and 
Pierce 2010) and some science writers, including Colin Tudge (2013, online, no 
page), who maintains that “the essence of life is cooperation. Life is not a punch-up. It 





The metaphor of life as ‘constructive dialogue’ is consistent with ideas developed in 
biosemiotics, which conceptualises “meaning-making as a general phenomenon in the 
communication processes at all levels of life” (Marais and Kull 2016, 171), and which 
extends the concept of ‘translation’ to mean “that some signs in one umwelt are put 
into a correspondence with some signs in another umwelt” (Kull and Torop 2011, 
414). As noted in section 2 above, relations of power infuse processes of translation, 
and this applies not only to the ways in which different social groups are represented, 
but to the representation of non-humans too. There is growing recognition of the 
political implications of insights from biosemiotics (see, for example Cannizzaro and 
Cobley 2015), while in translation studies, Cronin (2017, 71) proposes the term 
‘tradosphere’ to denote “the sum of all translation systems on the planet,” taking into 
account communication between all kinds of organism, and entailing “not 
anthropomorphic projection but communication across and in the full knowledge of 
radical difference.” 
I see here a potential convergence between the skills, experience and 
awareness of contributors to biosemiotics, translation studies and human-animal 
studies. My brief empirical investigations of HEAR in a corpus of general English and 
a more specialized corpus of discourse about animals illustrate the limitations of 
current metasemiotic resources. Perhaps dialogue between biosemiotics, translation 
studies and human-animal studies could be the start of developing new ways of 





The corpus of language about animals was compiled as part of the project ‘People’, 
‘products’, ‘pests’ and ‘pets’ – the discursive representation of animals, funded by 
the Leverhulme Trust (RPG 2013–063). The corpus pattern analysis of HEAR was 
carried out by Emma Franklin. I am grateful to them, and to Gaby Saldanha, two 
anonymous referees and the editors of the journal, for constructive feedback on an 
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